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Communication networks as smart infrastructure systems play an important role in smart girds to monitor, control, and manage
the operation of electrical networks. However, due to the interdependencies between communication networks and electrical
networks, once communication networks fail (or are attacked), the faults can be easily propagated to electrical networks which
even lead to cascading blackout; therefore it is crucial to investigate the impacts of failures of communication networks on the
operation of electrical networks.This paper focuses on cascading failures in interdependent systems from the perspective of cyber-
physical security. In the interdependent fault propagation model, the complex network-based virus propagation model is used
to describe virus infection in the scale-free and small-world topologically structured communication networks. Meanwhile, in
the electrical network, dynamic power flow is employed to reproduce the behaviors of the electrical networks after a fault. In
addition, two time windows, i.e., the virus infection cycle and the tripping time of overloaded branches, are considered to analyze
the fault characteristics of both electrical branches and communication nodes along time under virus propagation. The proposed
model is applied to the IEEE 118-bus system and the French grid coupled with different communication network structures.
The results show that the scale-free communication network is more vulnerable to virus propagation in smart cyber-physical
grids.
1. Introduction
The smart grid, as a modern electrical network (EN) infras-
tructure, can enhance the efficiency, reliability, and security of
traditional ENs based on the advancement of cyber-physical
systems [1–3]. In a smart grid, the monitoring, control,
and management of the EN depend closely on the smart
information and communication (cyber) network [4–6],
which works such that the EN ensures not only its own secure
operation but also reliable operation of the entire commu-
nication network. Meanwhile, when the EN fails (especially,
through cascading failure), fault cross-propagation between
the electrical and communication networks (ECNs), called
interdependent network, occurs, which increases the com-
plexity of fault propagation owing to interactions between
the ECNs. For example, the Italian blackout of 2003 was
triggered by effects of the ECN [7]. Therefore, exploring the
propagation mechanism of interactive cascading failures [8]
in an interdependent network has been receiving increasing
attention.
To date, the connection between the different coupling
modes between ECNs and the robustness/vulnerability of
interdependent networks has been investigatedwidely [9–12].
Studies have demonstrated that the different types of links
between ECNs greatly impact the robustness of the network.
For example, [10] reveals the double-network link allocation
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strategy is superior to single-network link allocation strategy.
Therefore, reasonably allocating the interconnecting links
between ECNs is vital for improving the robustness of
interdependent networks. Accordingly, a few models (e.g.,
Petri nets) have been introduced to reveal the mechanism of
interactions leading to catastrophic blackouts [13]. However,
these works have been done merely from the perspective of
the structure of the coupling of the ECNs.
Meanwhile, the physical and operational characteristics
considering the interactions have been focused on as well.
In [14], the impact of communication network vulnerability
on power system operation was assessed considering both
latency and communication interruptions.The data exchange
model is introduced for modeling cascading failures in
interdependent networks [15]. Reference [16] proposes a
simulation platform to analyze the ECN vulnerability by
considering the control strategy of power balance. Simi-
larly, other simulations [17, 18] have been proposed to ana-
lyze the fault mechanism considering interactions between
ECNs. Although these studies have included the interactions
between the communication network and EN, their focus
is only to study how to set up the simulation platform by
considering both the communication network and the EN.
Moreover, the operational characteristics are only studied
from a steady state point of view.
In addition, as communication networks become increas-
ingly smart and as smart grids are increasingly accessed using
the Internet owing to advancement of the energy Internet [19,
20], cyber threats (e.g., virus propagation; hacking attacks)
leading to interactive cascading failures should be focused on
[21, 22]. For instance, the 2015 blackout in the Ukraine was
a typical coordinated cyber-attack in which malicious code
was employed to tamper with data and control the server of
the monitoring system [23]. In the face of potential threats,
measures to enhance information security of communication
networks [24] and a few robust and efficient cyber infras-
tructures [25] have been proposed. For example, in Qinghai,
China, to prevent viral infection of networks, an antivirus
system was installed to manage the power dispatching data
network. This system successfully detected and neutralized
3384 viruses in 2010-2012 [26]. It is manifest that there is a
need to consider the virus propagation in the communication
network although it is a low-probability event, as such an
event can cause immense harm to the ECN owing to the
subtlety of the virus and the high speed at which the network
is infected by using advanced attack methods.
With this background, in our paper, we propose a
framework to analyze the performance of the ECN by con-
sidering the interactions between two types of propagations:
fault propagation in the EN and virus propagation in the
communication network.
In the EN, cascading failures have been analyzed from
the perspective of the overloaded mechanism [15, 27–29].
When a line fails, the power transmitted over the line will
be redistributed in the network, and thus, a fault may cause
increased flow in other branches and even overload them,
leading to the fault propagation. However, those analyses are
generally performed by through a steady state fashion. In
our study, we improved the dynamic power flow method
to redistribute loads and adjust unbalanced power in the
network during fault propagation by introducing the primary
frequency regulation and the equations of rotors of gener-
ators. Notably, we only consider high-voltage transmission
networks as the study objects.
For the virus propagation, virus spread models [30, 31]
with time delay have been developed based on the complex
network theory (CNT) from the perspective of the topolog-
ical structure of the communication network. Generally, the
communication network mainly has two topical topological
structures: scale-free and small-world networks. This paper
focuses on investigating the impacts of two types of networks
on electrical networks during virus propagation. In other
words, we analyze which type of communication network
is more vulnerable from the network-wise perspective, i.e.,
once viruses are propagated in a communication network,
which type of communication network can cause more
damage to the electrical network. Meanwhile, we further
analyze that in a communication network, the vulnerability
of communication nodes with different degree is revealed by
investigating the number of fault branches and blackout level
of coupled electrical networks.
In addition, it should be noted that the most modern
malware, surely most malware is used in known attacks to
power grids and industrial controls, limits its own effec-
tiveness by prematurely destroying/disabling nodes and is
not self-replicating. Furthermore, currently in a real-world
communication network vertexes will not be homogeneous;
thus they will not support most of self-propagating malicious
code. However, in order to consider a low-probability but
high consequence scenario, in this paper, we assume a
random constant spreadmalicious code (called “virus” in this
paper) with the following features to investigate the impact of
extreme case of self-propagating virus on the power system
from the network-wise perspective:
(1) the virus can block the communication between
infected vertexes and the control center;
(2) the virus can self-propagate among homogeneous
vertexes;
(3) a few infectious vertexes can be cured with the
probability owing to the strengthening of security measures;
(4) the differences of security level of each node are not
considered.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the interactions between the ECNs in
the coupling relationships and topological structures. In
Section 3, the virus propagation models with time delay
and information exchange model in the communication
network are introduced. The dynamic power flow method
and the overloadmechanism are established in Section 4.The
cascading failuresmodel considering the interactions and the
corresponding simulation analysis are described in Sections
5 and 6, respectively. In Section 7, we further discuss the
contribution of this paper and the external validity of the
modeling. Finally, conclusions are given with possible future
work in Section 8.
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Figure 1: Diagram of ECN in smart grids.
2. Interaction between Electrical and
Communication Networks in Smart Grid
2.1. Interdependent ECN in Smart Grids
ECN Spatial Model. The ECN in a smart grid is shown
in Figure 1. The communication network, a hierarchical
structure, is composed of optical fibers and synchronous
digital hierarchies (SDHs), including control centers and
communication vertexes [14, 32]. Generally, the substations
(generators and loads) in the electrical network have the cor-
responding communication vertexes. The coupling between
the substations and the communication vertexes is modeled
by a smart communication module comprising three layers:
process, bay, and control layers. Among the three layers,
the bay layer is mainly responsible for accepting commands
from the control layer to protect and monitor the electric
network and realizing real-time interaction of information
between the control and the process layers. The control
layer is responsible for sending real-time messages from
the electrical network to the control center as well as for
accepting commands from the control center through the
communication network.
ECN Operation Model. We analyze the ECN operation model
from the perspective of energy flow. In an ECN, there are two
types of energy flows: power flow and communication flow,
as shown in Figure 2. In an EN, power flow changes with time
via buses or lines. Conversely, because the communication
vertexes transmit and receive messages at regular intervals,
the communication flow is transmitted based on discrete
time.
Communication Topology between Vertexes and Branches.
Because there is a consistent one-to-one match between each
communication vertex and each bus node, each transmission
branch Bj has two related communication vertexes Vm1
and Vm2 during normal operation. In this paper, only Vm1
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Power flowCommunication flow
Figure 2: Information flows of electrical and communication
networks in smart grids.
is considered for exchanging information packets with the
control center [15].
2.2. Topological Structures of ECN
Electrical and Communication Network as Graphs. For sim-
plifying analysis of the topological structures, we abstracted
the ECN as graphs. The EN can be considered as a complex
network with nodes and links. The buses, including gener-
ators, loads, and substations, can be viewed as nodes while
transmission lines can be viewed as branches; therefore, the
electrical network is represented as the graph G𝐸 = (N,B).
The adjacent matrix 𝐺𝐸 = (𝑎𝑖𝑟)𝑀𝑁×𝑀𝑁 is employed to define
G𝐸 as follows:
𝑎𝑖𝑟 =
{
{
{
1 ∃𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑟 = 𝐵𝑗
0 ¬∃𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑟 = 𝐵𝑗
(1)
where𝑁𝑖𝑁𝑟 = 𝐵𝑗 represents that there is a branch𝐵𝑗 between
nodes𝑁𝑖 and𝑁𝑟.
Similarly, the optical fibers and SDHs of the commu-
nication network can be considered as edges and vertexes,
respectively; therefore, the communication network is repre-
sented as the graph G𝐶 = (V ,E). The adjacent matrix 𝐺𝐶 =
(𝑎󸀠𝑚V)𝑀𝑉×𝑀𝑉 is employed to define G𝐶 as follows:
𝑎󸀠𝑚V =
{
{
{
1 ∃𝑉𝑚𝑉V = 𝐸𝑎
0 ¬∃𝑉𝑚𝑉V = 𝐸𝑎
(2)
where𝑉𝑚𝑉V = 𝐸𝑎 represents that there is an edge 𝐸𝑎 between
vertices 𝑉𝑚 and 𝑉V.
Because the buses are coupled with the corresponding
communication vertexes by the communication module,
which is represented as L = {𝐿𝑏 | 𝐿𝑏 = 𝑁𝑖𝑉𝑚, 𝑖 = 𝑚},
the ECN can be developed as an interdependent graph G =
G𝐸 ∪ G𝐶 = (N ∪ V ,B ∪ E ∪ L).
Topological StructureAnalysis.We analyze the structural char-
acteristics from the perspective of theCNT. Existing literature
indicate that ENs have small-world networks [33–35], which
demonstrates that ENs have a relatively small average shortest
path but a very large cluster coefficient. Thus, the small-
world electrical networks reveal that if a node (or branch)
in the network fails, the adjacent and even nonadjacent
nodes (or branches) could fail, leading to cascading failures.
Meanwhile, ENs has scale-free characteristics, as determined
by analyzing changes in the network structure and function
when one or more nodes (or branches) are removed from
the network, which shows the networks are highly vulnerable
under deliberate attacks but robust under random attacks
[28]. However, fault propagation mechanism of ENs studied
from the perspective of pure topological structure is not
comprehensive and should more focus on the physical and
operational features.
In communication networks, generally, there are two
types of topological networks: scale-free networks and small-
world networks [15, 36, 37]. Communication networks with
scale-free structures contain a few nodes with high degree,
and they can be considered center nodes. Compared to the
small-world networks, the distributions of degree of which
are more uniform, scale-free networks have higher com-
munication efficiency but are more vulnerable to deliberate
attacks.
From the perspective of pure topological structures, com-
pared to ENs, fault (or virus) propagation in communication
networks is largely determined by its topological structure.
That is, a fault node (or branch) only causes neighboring
nodes to fail. Therefore, we employ the CNT to develop the
virus propagation models (VPMs) based on the topological
structures.
In summary, the EN and communication network in
smart grids have two essential differences in terms of the
interactions of cascading failures.
Features 1. From the perspective of time scales, the power
flow is transmitted based on continuous time, while the
communication flow is transmitted based on discrete time.
Features 2. From the perspective of topological structures,
fault propagation in the communication networks depends
more on the network structures. Compared with the commu-
nication networks, fault propagation in ENs depends more
on physical and operational modes because ENs comply with
operational rules, for example, Kirchhoff ’s law.
3. Virus Propagation and
Information Exchange Models in
Communication Networks
Before analyzing VPMs, we introduce the following topolog-
ical concepts:
The degree 𝑘𝑉𝑚 of 𝑉𝑚 is the number of neighboring
vertexes connected to 𝑉𝑚, as expressed by
𝑘𝑉𝑚 =
𝑀𝑉
∑
V=1
𝑎󸀠𝑚V (3)
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Degree distribution p(k) is the distribution function of
the degrees. That is, when a vertex is randomly selected from
the network, the probability that its degree is equal to k is p(k).
3.1. Virus Propagation Model Based on CNT. According to
Feature 1, virus propagation in the communication network
depends on the network structure; therefore, we employ
the SI [38–40] and SIR [41, 42] models based on CNT to
simulate virus propagation. In the SI model, the vertexes of
the communication network are divided into two groups:
susceptible setS and infectious set I. InS, the probability that
a susceptible vertex contracts the virus from the infectious
vertexes is 𝛽. Meanwhile, because the virus spends some
time in destroying the functions of susceptible vertexes (e.g.,
tampering with data or instructions), the susceptible vertexes
take time to get infected. Therefore, we introduce time delay
(virus infection cycle) to develop the SI model as follows:
𝑑𝑆 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = −𝛽𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) 𝑆 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
𝑑𝐼 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) 𝑆 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
(4)
On the basis of the SImodel, the SIRmodel considers that
a few infectious vertexes can be cured with the probability
owing to the strengthening of related antivirus measures
(e.g., formatting operation).Thus, the infectious vertexes can
obtain immunity in a certain virus removal cycle. Therefore,
the vertexes add a group called removed setR.The SIRmodel
with time delay is given as
𝑑𝑆 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = −𝛽𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) 𝑆 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
𝑑𝐼 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) 𝑆 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) − 𝛼𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏2)
𝑑𝑅 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏2)
(5)
Because an infectious vertex only transmits the virus
to its neighboring vertexes, the topological structure of the
network greatly influences virus propagation. When the
communication network is a small-world network, which can
be regarded as a uniform network owing to the relatively
uniform distribution of degree [37], the degree 𝑘𝑉𝑚 of 𝑉𝑚
is approximately equal to ⟨𝑘⟩, and the SIR model can be
presented as follows:
𝑑𝑆 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = −𝛽 ⟨𝑘⟩ 𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) 𝑆 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
𝑑𝐼 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽 ⟨𝑘⟩ 𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) 𝑆 (𝑡 − 𝜏1) − 𝛼𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏2)
𝑑𝑅 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏2)
(6)
𝑑𝑆 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = −𝛽𝑘𝑆𝑘 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
∑𝑘 𝑘𝑝 (𝑘) 𝐼𝑘 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
⟨𝑘⟩
𝑑𝐼 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝑘𝑆𝑘 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
∑𝑘 𝑘𝑝 (𝑘) 𝐼𝑘 (𝑡 − 𝜏1)
⟨𝑘⟩
− 𝛼𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏2)
𝑑𝑅 (𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼 (𝑡 − 𝜏2)
(7)
When the communication network is a scale-free net-
work, the vertexes have different damage levels from the
perspective of virus propagation because the distribution of
degree follows a power law.That is, the greater the 𝑘𝑉𝑚 of𝑉𝑚,
themore serious it is for the𝑉𝑚 to spread or contract the virus
to more vertexes. The SIR model can be expressed as (7) in
terms of the vertex degree [43, 44].
Generally, in the SI and SIR models, virus propagation is
faster in scale-free networks owing to the power law distri-
bution. In addition, by comparing SI and SIR models, once
virus propagation occurs in the communication network, we
can investigate whether the related antivirus measures with
time delay can play an important role to prevent the fault from
spreading across the EN.
3.2. Information Exchange Model in Communication Net-
work. In the smart grid, the communication vertexes send
operational data (parameters) associated with branches to
the control center and receive commands from the control
center step-by-step through the communication network in
the form of information packets. At every step, the same
information packets can be received and sent only by each
communication vertex. Before constructing the information
exchange model, three simplifications are made as follows.
(1)The communication blocks of vertexes (or edges) are
not considered in process of the information transfer when
the vertexes work orderly.That is, the capacity of the vertexes
is adequate to exchange/handle the information packets.
(2) Because the vertexes send and receive information
packets at intervals of 0.833 ms [45], the time required
for information exchange between the vertexes and control
center can be ignored because it is very small compared to
the time required for fault propagation in the EN.
(3) Because we focus on the interactions between the
ECNs, the methods of gathering and dealing with the infor-
mation (such as the measuring units, transmission channels
and protocols, encryption and decryption algorithms, etc.)
are not considered.
Based on the above simplifications, the information
exchange model is constructed based on the structure of the
communication network.
Communication Rules between Target Vertex and Control
Center. The vertexes abide by the rule of first-in-first-out
to send out information packets to avoid exchange of the
information packets to be in the same edge. At first, the target
vertex produces information packets. Then, the information
packets are sent to all its neighbor vertexes. If the control
center is one of the neighbor vertexes, the information
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transfer ends; otherwise, all neighbor vertexes, acting as
target vertexes, continue to send the information packets to
their corresponding neighbor vertexes until the information
packets are sent to the control center. In the above process,
the information packets are transmitted successfully between
the target vertex and control center if a path exists between
them in the communication network.
4. Dynamic Power Flow and Overload
Mechanism Models in Electrical Networks
4.1. Dynamic Power Flow in Electrical Networks. To redis-
tribute power flow during disturbances, we employ primary
frequency regulation [46, 47] and rotor equation [48] to
model the dynamic power flow method.
System Frequency Characteristics. We employ primary fre-
quency regulation to adjust the power flow. The characteris-
tics of load and generation frequency are given by (8) and (9),
respectively.
Δ𝑃𝑋 = 𝐾𝑋Δ𝑓 (8)
Δ𝑃𝑊 = 𝐾𝑊Δ𝑓 (9)
𝐾𝑋 and𝐾𝑊 are calculated as follows:
𝐾𝑋 =
∑𝑁𝑋𝑞=1 (𝐾𝑅𝑞 ⋅ 𝑃𝑅𝑟𝑞)
∑𝑁𝑋𝑞=1 𝑃𝑅𝑟𝑞
(10)
𝐾𝑊 =
∑𝑁𝑊𝑐=1 (𝐾𝑊𝑐 ⋅ 𝑃𝑊𝑟𝑐)
∑𝑁𝑊𝑐=1 𝑃𝑊𝑟𝑐
(11)
Unbalanced Power Redistribution. To redistribute the unbal-
anced power Pun due to disturbances of the system, we
first calculate the change in system frequency by using the
primary frequency regulation and the rotor equation.
𝑇𝐽
𝑑Δ𝜔
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑃𝑢𝑛 − 𝐾𝐸 ⋅ Δ𝜔 (𝑡) (12)
In (12), Pun is calculated as follows:
𝑃𝑢𝑛 =
𝑀𝑊
∑
𝑐=1
𝑃𝑊𝑐 −
𝑀𝑋
∑
𝑐=1
𝑃𝑋𝑞 (13)
When Pun < 0, we consider the characteristics of load and
the generation frequency to adjust the system frequency:
𝐾𝐸 = 𝐾𝑋 + 𝐾𝑊 (14)
WhenPun > 0, we consider only the generation frequency
characteristic:
𝐾𝐸 = 𝐾𝑊 (15)
By using (8)-(15), the changes in every generator and load
can be expressed as follows:
Δ𝑃𝑋𝑞 = 𝐾𝑋𝑞 ⋅ Δ𝜔 (𝑡) (16)
Δ𝑃𝑊𝑐 = 𝐾𝑊𝑐 ⋅ Δ𝜔 (𝑡) (17)
Then, we employ the P-Q power flow to calculate the
power flows of each bus (𝑞 = 𝑐 = 𝑖) as follows:
𝑃𝑖 = −Δ𝑃𝑊𝑞 + Δ𝑃𝑋𝑐
+ ]𝑖
𝑀𝑁
∑
𝑢=1
]𝑢 (𝐺𝑖𝑢 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑢 + 𝐵𝑖𝑢 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑢)
= (−𝐾𝑊𝑞 + 𝐾𝑋𝑐) Δ𝜔
+ ]𝑖
𝑀𝑁
∑
𝑢=1
]𝑢 (𝐺𝑖𝑢 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑢 + 𝐵𝑖𝑢 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑢)
(18)
𝑄𝑖 = ]𝑖
𝑀𝑁
∑
𝑢=1
]𝑢 (𝐺𝑖𝑢 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑢 − 𝐵𝑖𝑢 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑢) (19)
Dynamic Power Flow Method. When branches fault during
fault propagation in the network, the dynamic power flow can
be calculated in Algorithm 1.
4.2. Overload Mechanism of Electrical Networks. In this
paper, cascading failures in the EN are analyzed from the
perspective of the overload mechanism. When one or more
lines are cut off, the other lines are overloaded owing to
the redistribution of power flow in the EN [27, 28]. When
a branch is overloaded, the larger the power flow over the
branch, the shorter is the operational time for which the
branch is permitted to continue working [15]. As most of
other studies [15, 49], in this paper, we assume that during
the fault propagation, the control center tries to maintain
the secure operation of the EN and lower the load shedding
amount, thus the control strategy includes which branches
to trip, how to adjust the generators output, as well as to
shed which load of howmany percentages, etc.Therefore, for
some of the branches, the tripping command has to come
from the control center. Of course, for some of the faulted
lines, the tripping signal should be issued by a local protection
unit. However, to simplify the process, we simply assume
that the tripping command comes from the control center.
Thus, under thus simplification, when the corresponding
communication vertexes send information about overloading
to the control center via the communication network, the
control center must quickly send trip commands to the target
vertexes. We employ the inverse-time overcorrect protection
scheme [15, 49] to calculate the overloaded operational time.
𝑡𝐵𝑗 =
𝜅
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝐼𝐵𝑗/𝐼𝐵𝑗
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝜎
− 1 (20)
If the data exchange between the target vertex and control
center to trip the branchBj is completedwithin tBj, the control
is successful; otherwise, the control is unsuccessful.
5. Interactive Cascading Failure Model
A diagram of cascading failures considering the interactions
between the ECN is shown in Figure 3. During the cascading
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Input: Electrical network information
Output: Power flows of branches, frequency violation
Step 1: Unbalanced power: Employ Equation (13) to
calculate the unbalanced power 𝑃𝑢𝑛 of the
network.
Step 2: System frequency characteristic: IF 𝑃𝑢𝑛 < 0, employ
Equation (14) to calculate 𝐾𝑆 and go to the next
step; ELSE, IF 𝑃𝑢𝑛 > 0, employ Equation (15) to
calculate 𝐾𝑆 and go to the next step; ELSE, go to Step 4.
Step 3: Frequency calculation: Calculate variation Δ𝑓(𝑡) of
frequency of the network by Equation (12) solved
using improved Euler method (Δt = 0.01 s).
Step 4: Generator frequency detection: IF Δ𝑓(𝑡) is beyond
limits of generator i, cut off generator i and return
to Step 3; ELSE, go to the next step.
Step 5: Frequency violation: IF Δ𝑓(𝑡) is beyond limits
the network, end the algorithm and send warnings of
of instability; ELSE, go to the next step.
Step 6: Power flow calculation: Employ the P-Q power
flow to calculate the power flows of every branch.
Algorithm 1: Dynamic power flow method.
failures in the EN, if branch𝐵𝑗 is overloaded, according to the
control strategy, 𝐵𝑗 generates fault information packets, and
the corresponding communication vertexes then send these
packets to the control center via the communication network.
Thereafter, the control center sends the commands back to 𝐵𝑗
within 𝑡𝐵𝑗 .
In addition, when the virus spreads through the com-
munication network, the infectious vertex 𝑉𝑙 will lose the
function of information exchange and connectivity 𝑎󸀠𝑚𝑙 with
its neighbor vertexes, according to
𝑎󸀠𝑚𝑙 = 0 (m = 1, 2, . . . ,MV) (21)
Meanwhile, the virus will cause branches to trip or lead
to an outage directly or indirectly because the infectious ver-
texes lose the function of information exchange. Accordingly,
there are four types of fault branches.
Type 1. The branch is forced to trip because the correspond-
ing communications get infected, also called forced outage
branches B𝐹𝑂.
Type 2. The branch is tripped properly because the control
center successfully sends commands to the corresponding
vertexes based on the received overload information and con-
trol strategy with 𝑡𝐵𝑗 , also called overload tripping branches
B𝑂𝑇.
Type 3. The branch is damaged irreparably owing to control
failures via the communication networks, leading to overload
operational time exceeding tBj, also called irreparable fault
branches B𝐼𝐹.
Type 4. The branch undergoes forced outage owing to
network splitting, also called network splitting branchesB𝑁𝑆.
Dynamic power flow 
calculation
Overload tripping
Forced outage
Irreparable faults
Overload
Removed vertexes
Infectious vertexes
Susceptible vertexes
Virus propagation
Control center
SIR model
Normal operation Information 
packets
Commands
Electrical network Communication network
BFO
BOT
BIF
S
I
R
Figure 3: Cascading failures considering interactions between
ECNs.
Based on the above analysis, cascading failure con-
sidering the interactions between the ECNs is modeled
in Algorithm 2.
6. Case Study
The proposed model was applied to the IEEE 118-bus system
and the French grid [50]. The small-world and scale-free
networks were adopted to represent the respective commu-
nication networks. The computational work was performed
in MATLAB running on a laptop. The laptop (Compaq,
v3646TU) was equipped with an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU
T7250@2.00 GHz, 2.00 GB RAM, and 64-bit Windows 7
operating system.
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Input: Electrical network information and parameters,
communication network information and parameters, 𝜂, I,
𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜏1
Output: 𝜗, B𝐹𝑂, B𝑂𝑇, B𝐼𝐹, B𝑁𝑆
Step 1: Initialization: t = 0 s, 𝜗 = 0, B𝐹𝑂 = 0, B𝑂𝑇 = 0,
B𝐼𝐹 = 0, B𝑁𝑆 = 0, B𝑂 = 0, S = 0, R = 0, R󸀠 = 0 and
I󸀠 = 0.
Step 2: WHILE t<𝜂
Electrical network:
Step 3: Forced branch outage: IF the corresponding
vertexes coupled with the branch 𝐵𝑗 (j = 1, 2, . . . ,MB) are in
I, add the branch 𝐵𝑗 to B𝐹𝑂 and trip it.
Step 4: Overloaded branch tripping: IF the overload
operation time of 𝐵𝑥(𝐵𝑥 ∈ B𝑂)(x = 1, 2, . . . ,MO) in tBx = t,
and the fault packages between the corresponding vertexes
and control center are exchanged successfully, add 𝐵𝑥 to
B𝑂𝑇, and delete 𝐵𝑥 from B𝑂; ELSE, IF tBx > t, add 𝐵𝑥 to
B𝐼𝐹, and delete 𝐵𝑥 from B𝑂
Step 5: Network splitting: Detect and split the electrical
network. IF there exists the forced outage branch 𝐵𝑧
(z = 1, 2, . . . ,MNS) due to the splitting, add 𝐵𝑧 to B𝑁𝑆.
Step 6:Network operational status: Calculate the power
flow over 𝐵𝑗 (j = 1, 2, . . . ,MB). IF 𝐵𝑗 is overloaded,
calculate tBj of 𝐵𝑗 by Equation (19), and add 𝐵𝑗 to B𝑂.
Communication network:
Step 8: Infectious vertexes detection: IF the infection time
of the candidate vertex 𝑉𝑘 (k = 1, 2, . . . ,MI󸀠 ) in I󸀠 is equal to
t, add 𝑉𝑘 to I and delete it from I󸀠.
Step 10: Removal of vertex detection: IF the removal time
of the candidate vertex 𝑉𝜔 (w = 1, 2, . . . ,MR󸀠 ) in R󸀠 is equal to
t, add 𝑉𝑤 to R, and delete it from R󸀠.
Step 7: Virus propagation: The susceptible vertex 𝑉𝑔 (𝑔 =
1, 2, . . . ,MS) contracts the virus with probability 𝛽
according to Equation (6). IF 𝑉𝑔 gets infected, delete 𝑉𝑔
from S, add 𝑉𝑔 to I󸀠, and label its infectious time t + 𝜏1.
Step 9: Vertex immunization: The infected vertex 𝑉𝑙 (l =
1, 2, . . . ,MI) is immunized with the probability 𝛼 according to
Equation (6). IF 𝑉𝑙 obtains immunity, delete 𝑉𝑙 from I, add
𝑉𝑙 to R󸀠, and label its immunity time t + 𝜏2.
Step11: t = t + Δt; ENDWHILE.
Algorithm 2: Cascading failure model considering interactions between ECNs (SIR model as an example).
6.1. IEEE 118-Bus System. We randomly chose the commu-
nication vertexes as the initial infectious vertexes and then
performed 1000 cascading events to investigate load shedding
and number of instances of the four types of fault branches
(MIF, MOT, MFO, and MNS) based on the different VPMs and
topological structures of the communication network with
the parameters Δt = 0.01 s, 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = 5𝑠, 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0.3, 𝜅 = 7
and 𝜎 = 1.5. The averaged results are shown in Figure 4 and
listed in Table 1.
Figure 4 shows that the load shedding changes with the
passage of time based on the different topological structures
of the communication networks and the SI model. Owing
to space limits, the SIR-model-based load shedding is not
given herein. In Figure 4, the propagation time of interactive
cascading failures depends on the virus propagation time 𝜏1,
and the load shedding is themaximumwhen the propagation
time is approximately 10s. Compared with the small-world
communication network, the propagation time of interactive
cascading failures is longer in the scale-free communication
network.Moreover, coupling with the scale-free communica-
tion network, the fault branches of the EN result in irrepara-
ble faults (MIF = 3.415) with higher probability than that (MIF
= 0.245) in the case of coupling with the small-world com-
munication network, as summarized in Table 1.Therefore, the
coupling of EN with the scale-free communication network
is affected more severely as the propagation time increases
because the connectivity between vertexes often depends
on a few hub vertexes (i.e., high-degree vertexes), and the
exchange of information packets becomes difficult, leading to
network paralysis once a few hub vertexes are infected.
A comparison of the SI and the SIR models shows that
different VPMs have very small impacts on fault propagation
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Table 1: Average numbers of four types of fault branches.
VPMs Structures MFO MIF MOT MNS
SI SW 148.164 0.245 14.589 9.1554
SF 142.977 3.415 14.643 10.1554
SIR SW 148.222 0.139 14.658 9.336
SF 143.104 1.371 16.588 10.064
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Figure 4: Load shedding of IEEE 118-bus system over time based on
SI model.
in the EN, which indicates that once fault propagation occurs
in the EN, the related antivirus measures with time delay
can barely prevent the fault from spreading across the EN.
However, the number of fault branches with irreparable
faults can be reduced, especially in the case of coupling with
the scale-free communication network. This is because the
immune vertexes treated with the antivirus recover their
function of data exchange, and a few overloaded branches can
receive trip commands from the control center in a timely
manner, thus avoiding irreparable faults.
Furthermore, we analyze the interactive cascading fail-
ures by selecting different initial infectious vertexes. We used
the SI model as an example. Because the degree distributions
of the small-world communication network are known, we
take the scale-free network as the basis to select the high-
degree (vertexes 115 and 116) and small-degree (vertexes 4
and 8) vertexes as the initial infectious vertexes. Figures 5
and 6 show the total and real-time load shedding changes
with the passage of time for different virus propagation times
𝜏1= 2 s, 5 s, and 8 s. The initial vertexes have small impacts
on fault propagation in the EN owing to the known degree
distribution. However, in case of the coupling of the EN with
the scale-free communication network, the initial vertexes
greatly impact fault propagation. Compared to the small-
world communication network, when the initial vertexes
are high-degree vertexes in the scale-free communication
network, the propagation time is obviously shorter, which
demonstrates the hub can rapidly spread the virus, leading
to rapid collapse of the EN. By contrast, the propagation
time is longer when the initial vertexes are the low-degree
vertexes, and when the load shedding peaks, as shown in
Figure 6, the interactive cascading failures continue to spread,
which indicates virus propagation times are longer than
fault propagation times. That is, when fault propagation has
stopped, virus propagation continues.
6.2. FrenchGrid. A real French gridwith 1951 nodes and 2956
branches was employed to simulate the interactive model.
Owing to computational complexity, we only choose the
high-degree vertexes as initial infectious vertexes considering
the topological structures of the communication network
with the parameters Δt = 0.01 s, 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = 2s, 𝛼 =
𝛽 = 0.3, 𝜅 = 7, and 𝜎 = 1.5. Figure 7 shows that
the total and real-time load shedding of system changes
with the passage of time. Compared to the small-world
communication network, the propagation times are longer
in the case of EN coupled with scale-free communication
network, but the load shedding peaks at approximately 8.3 s
under both topological structures.
Furthermore, we investigated the numbers of the three
types of fault branches (MIF, MOT, and MFO) at different
moments, as shown in Figures 8(a) and 8(b). Between 6 s
and 7 s, the fault propagation is at its height, which indicates
that the numbers of infectious vertexes and forced outage
branches B𝐹𝑂 are the highest, leading to rapid collapse of the
EN and surging load loss. In addition, in the fault propagation
process in the EN, the fault branches with irreparable faults
are not found when the EN is coupled with the small-world
communication network. By contrast, there are many fault
branches of this type at different moments in the case of
EN coupled with the scale-free communication network.
Therefore, when the communication network is scale-free, it
is more vulnerable which cannot effectively resist the virus
propagation leading to the more severe damage to the EN.
The conclusions obtained from these two cases are
summed up in Table 2. In practice, when ENs are faced with
hacker attacks, because the attackers find it relatively difficult
to obtain complete information about the communication
networks, such as topological structures, their attacks are
random to some extent, which means scale-free communica-
tion networks are more appropriate for the ENs [10, 30, 31].
However, when ENs are faced with the threat of a cyber
virus, the virus must be cleared promptly. Once the virus
spreads, regardless of whether the initial infectious vertexes
are selected randomly or deliberately, the infectionwill lead to
a severe damage in the scale-free communication networks.
Therefore, due to the propagation features of the scale-
free communication networks, the simulation results show
that software engineers should strengthen more the software
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Figure 5: Load shedding of IEEE 118-bus system over time in the case of high-degree initial infectious vertexes. (a) Total load shedding over
time; (b) real-time load shedding.
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Figure 6: Load shedding of IEEE 118-bus system over time with low-degree initial infectious vertexes. (a) Total load shedding over time; (b)
real-time load shedding.
protections in the scale-free communication networks by
means of more frequent update of the firewalls and antivirus
software, strategies of automatic system restoration, etc.
7. Discussion
In this paper, we extend the state of the art for the study of the
integrated communication network and electrical network.
Compared with other literature, the main contributions of
our paper are as follows:
We propose an interdependent fault propagation model
which holistically considers the extreme virus propagation
in the communication network to reveal the vulnerability
of electrical network coupled with different communication
network structures at the first time.
In the fault propagation model, to better reproduce the
ex-post behavior of the electrical networks, we extended the
dynamic power flow by including the primary frequency
regulation and the equations of rotors of generators.
To solve the issue of different time frames in the interde-
pendent system, we adopt two time windows, i.e., the virus
infection cycle of nodes and tripping time of overloaded
branches during fault propagation to analyze the fault mech-
anism of both electrical branches and communication nodes
along time.
It should be noted that even though the electrical network
and communication network are both presented as graphs
to conveniently describe their interdependent topological
relationship in this paper, the modeling approach captured
most of the relative features of the two networks.
For the electrical network, besides the commonly consid-
ered steady state physical and operational rules, we also adopt
the rotor equation and system frequency to consider simple
system dynamics in order to present the interactions between
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Table 2: Comparison of propagation times between SW and SF networks.
Objects Types of propagation Initial factious vertexes
High-degree Low-Degree
ECN Interactive SW>SF SW<SF
Electrical network Fault SW=SF SW=SF
Communication Network Virus SW>SF SW<SF
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Figure 7: Load shedding of IEEE 118-bus system over time based on SIRmodel. (a) Total load shedding over time; (b) real-time load shedding.
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Figure 8: Numbers of different types of fault branches over time based on SIR model. (a) Scale-free network; (b) small-world network.
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the electrical network and the communication network. As
for the communication networks, we assume that the security
level of each node is the same in terms of the infected rate.
By contrast, in reality, the probability of the communication
nodes got infectedmay vary for different nodes. However, the
assumptionmade in our paper does not change the essence of
the analysis and results in terms of evaluating which topology
of communication networkwould have higher impacts on the
electrical network during cyber-attacks.
8. Conclusions
The cyber-physical security of power systems is attracting
increasing attention, especially after more and more evi-
dences show that failures or attacks happening in the cyber
system can greatly destroy the secure operation of power
systems and bring tremendous consequences. To investigate
the possible consequences, we propose an approximate inter-
active model to study cascading failures in ENs caused by
virus in communication networks via two types of propa-
gation. Our simulation on a standard study case, i.e., IEEE
118-bus system, and a realistic network, i.e., French grid,
shows that the structure of the communication network has
decisive impacts on the ECN in terms of the propagation
time of cascading failures, loading shedding, number of
faulted branches, etc. However, due to the simplification
of the communication network and the virus propagation
mechanism, the model can still be refined. In addition, the
analysis is only focused on the overload of the system which
may limit the results to part of behaviors of the EN.
Owing to the complexity of the propagation mechanism
of interactive cascading failures, future work in this field will
focus on considering more factors, such as data transmission
delay, to simulate interactive cascading failures. Meanwhile,
we also can investigate the impacts of differences of virus
infection of nodes on interdependent fault propagation for
electrical and communication networks. In addition, we can
also analyze other aspects of the integrated CPS system, such
as reliability, resilience, etc., under the virus propagation, to
provide other dimensions for understanding the CPS.
Nomenclature
ECN: Electrical and communication network
SDH: Synchronous digital hierarchy
CNT: Complex network theory
VPM: Virus propagation model
SM: Small-world
SF: Scale-free
EN: Electrical network.
Sets (Note at | ⋅ | Represents the Dimension of a Set)
N: Set of nodes (i.e., buses) in an electrical
network, N = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑁𝑖, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ }, |N| = 𝑀𝑁
W: Set of nodes with generators,
W = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,𝑊𝑐, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ N, |W| = 𝑀𝑊
X: Set of nodes with loads,
X = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑋𝑞, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ N, |X| = 𝑀𝑋
B: Set of branches (i.e., lines) in an
electrical network, B = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐵𝑗, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ },
NiNr = Bj, |B| = 𝑀𝐵
G𝐸: Electrical network, G𝐸 = (N,B)
V : Set of vertexes (i.e., optical fibers) in a
communication network,
V = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑉𝑚, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ }, |V | = 𝑀𝑉
E: Set of edges (i.e., SDHs) in a
communication network,
E = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐸𝑎, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ }, VmVv = Ea, |E| = 𝑀𝐸
G𝐶: Communication network, G𝐶 = (V ,E)
L: Set of links which present the couples
between electrical network and
communication network,
L = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐿𝑏, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ }, 𝐿𝑏 = 𝑁𝑖𝑉𝑚, 𝑖 = 𝑚,
|L| = 𝑀𝐿
G: Electrical and communication network,
G = G𝐸 ∪ G𝐶
S: Set of susceptible vertexes,
S = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑉𝑔, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ V , |S| = 𝑀𝑆
I: Set of infectious vertexes,
I = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑉𝑙, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ V , |I| = 𝑀𝐼
I󸀠: Set of candidate infectious vertexes,
I󸀠 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑉𝑘, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ V , |I󸀠| = 𝑀𝐼󸀠
R: Set of removed vertexes,
R = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑉ℎ, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ V , |R| = 𝑀𝑅
R󸀠: Set of candidate removed vertexes,
R󸀠 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑉𝑤, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ V , |R󸀠| = 𝑀𝑅󸀠
B𝐼𝐹: Set of branches with irreparable faults
due to the control failures,
B𝐼𝐹 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐵𝑒, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ B, |B𝐼𝐹| = 𝑀𝐼𝐹
B𝑂𝑇: Set of fault branches with overload
tripping due to the control successes,
B𝑂𝑇 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐵𝑔, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ B, |B𝑂𝑇| = 𝑀𝑂𝑇
B𝐹𝑂: Set of branches with forced outage due
to the corresponding communication
vertexes get infected,
B𝐹𝑂 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐵𝑦, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ B, |B𝐹𝑂| = 𝑀𝐹𝑂
B𝑁𝑆: Set of branches with forced outage due
to the network splitting,
B𝑁𝑆 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐵𝑧, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ B, |B𝑁𝑆| = 𝑀𝑁𝑆
B𝑂: Set of overloaded branches,
B𝑂 = {⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐵𝑥, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ } ⊆ B, |B𝑂| = 𝑀𝑂.
Constants
𝑎𝑖𝑟: The branch between Ni and Nr
𝑎󸀠𝑚V: The edge between Vm and Vv
PWrc: Power rating of generator c
PRrq: Power rating of load q
KWc: cth generator unit power regulation
KW: Equivalent generator unit power
regulation
KXq: qth load frequency regulation
KX: Equivalent load frequency regulation
KE: System unit power regulation
TJ: Equivalent Inertia time constant
TJc: Inertia time constant of generator c
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kVm: Degree of vertex m
p(k): Degree distribution
𝜅: Proportional coefficient of inverse-time
overcurrent protection
𝜎: Power coefficient of inverse-time
overcurrent protection
𝐼𝐵𝑗: Current limit of branch Bj.
Variables
t: Time / clock
tBj: Overloaded operational time of branch Bj
𝜂: Simulation time
⋅(t): Value / set of a variable at time t
Δt: Time step
⋅k: Value / set of vertex(es) with k degrees
Pun: System unbalanced power
Δf: Frequency offset
ΔPW: Changes of power of all generators
ΔPWc: Changes of power of generator c
ΔPX: Changes of power of all loads
ΔPXq: Changes of power of load q
PXq: Power of load q
IBj: Current over branch Bj
Pi: Injection active power of node i
Qi: Injection reactive power of node i
Biu: Equivalent susceptance between nodes i and u
Giu: Equivalent conductance between nodes i and u
𝜃𝑖𝑢: Voltage phase angle difference between nodes i
and u
]𝑖: Voltage of node i
Δ𝜔: Changes of angular acceleration of equivalent
generator
𝜗: The percentage of load shedding
S: Percentage of susceptible vertexes, S = MS/MV
I: Percentage of infectious vertexes, I = MI/MV
R: Percentage of removed vertexes, R = MR/MV
𝛽: Infection rate from susceptible vertex to
infectious vertex
𝛼: Recovery rate from infectious vertex to
removed vertex
𝜏1: Virus infection cycle
𝜏2: Virus removal cycle.
Matrix
𝐺𝐸: Connectivity of the graph G𝐸, G𝐸 = (𝑎𝑖𝑟)𝑀𝑁×𝑀𝑁
𝐺𝐶: Connectivity of the graph G𝐶, G𝐶 = (𝑎󸀠𝑚V)𝑀𝑉×𝑀𝑉 .
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